The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation. 868 F.3d 231. (3d Cir. 2017) 855 F.3d 12 (6th Cir. 2017) and ruled that the district court wrongly dismissed class action claims. The case involved claims under the Hatch-Waxman Law filed by consumers in the Hatch Act, which states that companies with patents for Lipitor or Effexor XR engaged monopolistic procurement and enforcement proceedings against generic manufacturers to thwart competition. The allegations stem from antitrust law not patent law, therefore they should have been stayed in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rather than being decided in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
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The allegations of fraudulent procurement and enforcement of patents didn’t originate under the patent law the Third Circuit held, denying motions to transfer the Hatch-Waxman case to the Federal Circuit. 855 F.3d 126, 343, (3d Cir. 2017. The purpose of the framework it was stated it was to promote generic drug competition, to ensure the safety of the public, and offer incentives for the manufacture of generic medicines. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also called the Hatch-Waxman Act, was enacted by Congress to help encourage generic drug makers to challenge patents with weak claims.
Name-brand drug makers must submit a New Drug Application (under the Act) to FDA. Generic manufacturers can submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application if the original manufacturer has approved the application. This certification will confirm that the generic does not violate the patents of the original manufacturer. Generics with the identical active ingredients as the brand-name drug and are biologically comparable to the drug may be filed without the same rigorous tests.
If the patent has expired or invalid, or isn’t being infringed by generics, there’s no violation of the patent. The FDA will not approve generics for at least 30 month if the manufacturer of the name brand drug is not in agreement. The Abbreviated New Drug Application is made by the initial generic manufacturer. This allows the first manufacturer of generics to produce the generic drug for six months prior to when any other manufacturers can market their version.
The most surprising risk with the system is that it could encourage collusion between the name-brand and generic manufacturers. In F.T.C. in F.T.C. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 22, 2227, 186 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2013) the Supreme Court held that payments from patentees to infringers through “reverse settlement agreements for payment” are subject to antitrust claims. In a reverse payment settlement agreement where the manufacturer of the name brand does not pay the generic company to produce the drug, thus allowing the name brand to continue to charge the highest price for the product. Since the generic manufacturer gets the money to not compete and this results in an antitrust conspiracy.
The same thing consumers said was the case in the Third Circuit cases: Lipitor and Effexor XR manufacturers had paid generic manufacturers to avoid competing with brand-name products. The Third Circuit ruled that antitrust claims stemmed from the law of competition, not patent law. Even though patent law must be examined but the case is not require transfer to another court. This would cause further delays. But the court of appeals held the record did not clearly show the federal diversity jurisdiction, which required the trial court to decide whether federal courts have jurisdiction. On remand the trial court rejected the complaint in the case against both the Lipitor manufacturer and the Effexor XR manufacturer.
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, and ruled that the Lipitor plaintiffs had a plausible claim that the companies engaged in illegal reverse payment settlement agreements. 868 F.3d 231 25, and 258 (3d Cir. 2017). The alleged illegal reverse-payment settlement deal was forged when the manufacturer of Lipitor compensates the generic manufacturer that does not have any valid claim to damages. When the patent holder and generic manufacturer make the deal to stop competition, that is in violation of antitrust law. Therefore, the problem is only one time